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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ROYAL AUDREY BACKUS, I 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 837 5 
I 
BUS S. HOOTEN and ELLA H. ) 
HOOTEN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondents agree with the statement of the case 
set forth in appellant's brief, with the exception that re-
spondents contend that there are other parts of the 
plaintiff's complaint in addition to Paragraph 9, referred 
to in the last paragraph of page one of appelant's brief, 
which should not be taken as true in passing on respond-
ents' motion to dismiss, namely, such allegations as are 
contained in the last five lines of Paragraph 4 of plain-
tiff's complaint beginning with the word "and" in 
the fifth line of said paragraph and the allegations con-
tained in the last six lines of Paragraph 5 of plaintiff's 
complaint beginning with the word "believing" in the 
fifth line. These allegations are in the nature of beliefs 
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2 
or conclusions of the plaintiff, not facts. Only allegations 
of fact well pleaded in the c.omplaint must be taken as 
true in ruling on a pleading attacking the sufficiency 
of the complaint to state a cause of action. STATE 
EX REL STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH vs. 
EVANS, COUNTY TREASURER OF WEBER COUNTY, 
- 6 P. 2d 161, 79 Utah 370; PLATZ v. INTERNATIONAL 
SMELTING CO.- 213 P.187, 61 Utah 342. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
BY RESPONDENTS 
It is clear from the language of the complaint that 
the contract entered into between the contractor, Busby, 
and the land owners, respondents, was a contract for 
the leveling of land for agricultural purposes and that 
the appellant furnished to the contractor only machin-
ery and equipment used in leveling the land for agri-
cultural purposes. 
Respondents contend that the c.omplaint does not 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted for the 
following reasons: 
FIRST: That the contract pleaded, between the con-
tractor, Busby, and the respondents, landowners, namely, 
a contract for leveling land for agricultural purposes, is . 
not a contract falling within the provisions of Section 
14-2-1 U. C. A. 1953, requiring "The owner of any interest 
in land entering into a contract involving $500.00 or more 
for the construction, addition to, or alteration or repair 
of any buildi'ng, structure or improvement upon land," 
to take out a bond "conditional for the faithful perform-
ance of the contract and prompt payment for materials 
furnished and labor performed under the contract." (Un-
derlining ours). 
SECOND: That Appellant by hiring machinery and 
equipme·nt to the contractor, Busby, to be used by him in 
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leveling land for agricultural purposes, did not "furnish 
material or perform labor" in carrying out the contrac-
tor - landowners contract as contemplated by sections 
14-2-1 and 14-2-2 U. C. A. 1953, and hence these sections 
do not impose any personal liability on the landowners, 
respondents, to pay the rental value of the such land-
leveling machinery and equipment furnished to the con-
tractor. (Underlining ours). 
ARGUMENT 
1. RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. 
A. THE RIGHTS OF CLAIMANTS UNDER MECHAN-
ICS LIEN LAW STATUTES AND PRIVATE CON-
TRACTORS BOND STATUTES ARE PURELY 
STATUTORY AND THESE STATUTES CANNOT 
BE EXTENDED TO SITUATIONS OR PERSONS 
NOT FALLING WITHIN THEIR TERMS. 
In support of this rule see: AMERICAN TANK & 
EGUIPMENT CO. V. T. E. WIGGINS, INC. ET AL, 42 
P. 2d 115 (okl.), holding: 
1. Mechanics' liens are in derogation of common law 
and exist solely by positive statute, which courts should 
construe and enforce as remedial acts, but which can-
not to be extended to meet cases not within their scope. 
Also see the authorities cited under subdivision "D" 
of Rules of Statutory construction .. 
B. THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF A STATUTE IS 
TO BE DETERMINED FROM THE WHOLE AND 
EVERY PART OF SUCH STATUTE. 
BIRD & JEX CO. v. FUNK et al, 85 P. 2d 831, 96 
Utah 450, holding: 4. Legislative intent and purposes in 
enacting a statute is to be deduced from the whole and 
every part of the statute taken together. 
Hence in determining whether a landowner who en-
ters into a contract for the leveling of his land for agri-
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cultural purposes falls within the burdens of the Private 
Contractor Bond Statutes Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 U. C. 
A. 1953 or whether a claimant who rented machinery to 
the land-leveling contractor falls within the benefits of 
these statutes, it is not a matter of trying to decide what 
the terms "or improvement upon land" and the terms 
"material furnished or labor performed under the con-
tract" taken alone mean. These terms must be construed 
with the language which precedes and that which follows, 
the entire language of these statutes. 
C. WHERE GENERAL WORDS FOLLOW AN ENU-
MERATION OF SPECIFIC SITU AT I 0 N S OR 
THINGS, SUCH GENERAL WORDS ARE HELD 
AS APPLYING ONLY TO SITUATIONS OR THINGS 
OF THE SAME GENERAL KIND OR CLASS AS 
THOSE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED. 
In support of this rule see: YOUNG v. SHRIVER et 
al, 206 P. 99 (cal.); HOWE v. MYERS, 162 P. 100 (Wash.). 
Under this rule the general terms "or improve-
ment upon land" used in section 14-2-1 U. C. A. 1953, 
should be co·nstrued as having the same general mean-
ing as the specific situations or things preceding them, 
namely "for the construction, addition to, or alteration 
or repair of, any building, structure" upon land. The 
statute relates to buildings or structures upon land. It 
does not relate to situations or things or processes which 
co·nsitute mere agricultural betterments of the land, but 
which do not relate to the same classes or kinds of pro-
cesses as those specifically mentioned. 
The general words "or improvement upon la·nd" 
which follow the specific cases and situations expressed 
in the statute are restrained by words of specific enu-
meration preceding these general terms, namely, by the 
words "for the construction, additio·n to, or alteration or 
repair of any building, structure" a·nd by the general 
scope and purpose declared in the entire section. With-
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out limiting the scope of the enactment to the objects 
which were intended as determined by fairly construing 
the statute in its entirety, its meaning might be extended 
to include every improvement of, or betterment to land, 
which clearly was never intended. PILLOW v. KELLY 
et at, 296 S W 11 (Tenn.) 
D. MECHANICS LIEN STATUTES AND PRIVATE 
CONTRACTORS BOND STATUTES SHOULD NOT 
BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED AGAINST LAND-
OWNER TO BRING HIM WITHIN THE BURDENS 
OR LIBERALLY CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF 
CLAIMANT TO BRING HIM WITHIN THE BENE-
FITS, OF THESE STATUTES. 
:it is contended in appellant's brief that the statutes 
relied upon by appellant, sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 U.C.A. 
1953, should be liberally construed against the landown-
ers, respondents, and in favor of claimant, in an effort 
to bring the landowners within the burdens of these 
statutes, and in an effort to bring claimant within the 
benefits of these statutes. Respondents contend that there 
is no such rule requiring liberal construction of these 
statutes against landowners in an effort to bring them 
within the burdens of these statutes, who, without liberal 
construction against them do not fall within the scope 
of such statutes, or requiring a liberal construction in 
favor of claimants, who except for the application of lib-
eral construction in their favor would not fall within the 
benefits of such statutes. 
None of the cases cited in appellant's brief hold that 
the statutes under consideration here or similar statutes 
should be liberally construed against the landowner in an 
effort to bring him within the language of the statutes 
or in favor of claimant to bring him within the benefits 
of such statutes. None of these cases involved the ques-
tion of what type of improvement falls within the statutes 
or what type or kind of items furnished fall within the 
terms "performed labor" or "furnished materials." 
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The only point decided by the case of RIO GRANDE 
LUMBER CO v. DARKE et al, 167 P. 241, 50 Utah 114, 
quoted from in appelant's brief P. 10 as supporting liberal 
construction against landowners, was that Chapter 91 
Laws of Utah 1915, which was a forerunner of Section 
14-2-1 U.C.A. 1953, was constitutional. No question was 
raised or decided as to whether the statutes should be 
liberally construed against a landowner in an effort to 
bring him within the terms of the statute. In this case 
respondents furnished building materials which went 
into the building, and hence both the landowner and 
the claimant clearly fell within the scope of the stat-
ute. The language from this case quoted in appellant's 
brief was mere "loose talk" and did not relate to liberal 
construction either for or against the landowner or for 
or against the claimant, as no such point was involved 
in the case. 
The only point decided by the case of LIBERTY 
COAL & LUMBER CO. v. SNOW, 178 P. 341, 53 Utah 
298, (quoted from in appellant's brief P. 10) was that 
under Laws 1915, Chapter 91, a son, owner of land, who 
agreed with father that later should cause to be erected 
thereon, in return for use of land for indefinite period, a 
building worth from $1,000. to $1,100. was under duty to 
obtain from builder, or to require his father to obtain, 
bond securing payment for material furnisned, in default 
of which he himself was personally liable to material-
men. The court held that the agreement between the 
son, landowner, and the father, contractor, providing for 
the building of a building costing over $500. clearly fell 
within the statute and that plaintiff who furnished ma-
terials which went into the house also clearly fell within 
the provisions of the statutP.. No question of liberal con-
struction to bring the landowner within the provisions 
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of the statute was involved. The structure built by the 
contractor was a dwelling house and claimant had fur-
nished building materials which went into the house. 
The statute construed in the case of MELLON v. 
VONDOR-HORST BROS. et al, 140 P. 130, 44 Utah 300, 
quoted from in appellant's brief P. 11, was an entirely 
different statute than the statutes involved in our case. 
The statute relied upon by appellant was a statute pro-
vided that any person who had furnished materials or 
had performed labor for a contractor in the construction 
of any public building, may at any time before the con-
tract price has been fully paid, bring an actio·n against 
the contractor and the public body for the recovery of 
the amount due, and may obtain a judgment against 
both the contractor and the public body to the extent of 
reaching any funds in the hands of the public body due 
to the contractor. There was no question but what the 
appellant had performed labor and furnished materials 
in the construction of the public building, which brought 
claimant clearly within the statute. The court held that 
appellant was clearly entitled under the statute to reach 
the funds and was not required to obtain personal service 
on the contractor before reaching the funds. The lan-
guage quoted about liberal construction has no applica-
tion to our case. 
ELWELL v. MORROW et al, 78 p. 605, 28 Utah 278, 
quoted in appellant's brief P. 12 as favoring liberal con-
struction, likewise involved an entirely different point 
than is raised in our case. The question in the Elwell 
case was whether intervener had waived his lien by not 
filing and proving his lien within the time specified 
in the notice which was published as required by statute 
(before Feb. 20, 1903). The court held that claimant, 
being an original contractor, had 60 days after the com-
pletion of his contract in which to file for record his 
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claim for lien, and that he could not be deprived of this 
right by respondent Elwell arbitrarily fixing a date in his 
published notice requiring lienholders not parties to the 
suit to file their liens in c.ourt on a date before the ex~ 
piration of the 60 day period. The items furnished, build-
ing materials, and the structure built, a dwelling house, 
clearly fell within the scope of the statute and there was 
no necessity for invoking a liberal construction of the 
statute against the landlord to bring him within the bur-
dens or in favor of the claimant to bring him within the 
benefits of the statute. 
Not one of the cases cited, quoted from, or discussed 
in Appellant's Brief from pages 13 to 19, both inclusive, 
as favoring liberal construction, involved the construc-
tion of either a Mechanics Lien Law Statutes or a Pri-
vate Contractor's Bond Statute or a Public Contractor's 
Bond Statute. Every one of these cases involved the ques-
tion of the liability of a surety company under a surety 
bond, and involved the construction of the surety bond 
in each case. The statements made in these cases about 
liberal construction all related to the rule to be applied 
in the construction of surety bonds. Certainly, a surety 
bond, a contract, written, worded and issued by a surety 
for hire should be liberally construed against the surety 
company and in favor of a third party claimant under 
the bond. Quite a different rule of construction prevails 
in construing a surety bond in an action against the sure-
ty company, than prevails when construing either a me-
chanic's lien law statute or a private contractor's bonn 
statute, when attempting to determine what burdens 
are imposed by the statute upon the landowner and what 
third party claimants can claim be·nefits under such 
statutes. Such statutes are not liberally construed 
against the landowner and in favor of the claimant when 
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deciding what contracts fall within the burdens of the 
statutes and what claimants fall within the benefits of 
such statutes, as is hereinafter more fully pointed out. 
Why should Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 U.C.A. 1953, 
be liberally construed against landowners, in respondents 
situation, in an effort to bring them within the burdens 
of these statutes. Respondents had no part in hiring the 
land-leveling equipment from appellant-from all that 
appears in the Complaint respondents knew nothing of 
the machinery and equipment used by the contractor 
having been hired - this was a deal entirely between the 
!and-leveling contractor and appellant. Appellant has a 
cause of action against Busby, the contractor, with whom 
appellant dealt and doubtless originally intended to look 
to, for the contract price or the rental value of the ma-
chinery and equipment. Why should appella·nt not be 
required to look to the person with whom appellant dealt? 
Respondents were legally required to pay and have paid 
the land-leveling contractor, Busby, the full contract 
price for the leveling of their land. If the statutes are 
now liberally construed (stretched to the breaking 
point) to bring respondents within the burdens of the 
statutes respondents will have to pay twice for the level-
ing of their lands. Most farmers have difficulty in pay-
ing once for the leveling of their lands for agricultural 
purposes, and for other necessary agricultural better-
ments of their lands, and should not be required to pay 
twice. What are the equities against respondents in our 
case ·which demand a liberal construction of these stat-
utes against them? And what equities are there in our 
case that require that these statutes be liberally con-
strued in favor of appellant in an effort to bring appellant 
within the benefits of the statutes? There are none. 
In support of the rule designated D above, that 
Mechanics' Lien Statutes and Private Contractor's Bond 
Statutes should not be liberally construed against a land-
owner to bring him within the burdens of these statutes 
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or should not be liberally construed in favor of a claim-
ant to bring him within the benefits or scope of these 
statutes, respondents submit the following authorities: 
NANZ et al v. CUMBERLAND GAP PARKS CO., S. W. 
999 (TENN.) 
1. The rule that mechanics' lien statutes are to be 
liberally construed does not extend to the determination 
of what persons are entitled to liens thereunder, to which 
rna tter a statute can not be extended by construction. 
In this case the court said: "We think the statue 
refers to erections, structures, machinery, and buildings 
-things constructed upon the land-and not the enrich-
i'ng of the soil and beautifying the grounds by planting 
flowers, shrubs and trees upon it." 
PHILLIPS v. GRAVES, 9 P. 2d 490 (Oregon) 
5. Mechanics' lien statutes are strictly construed, 
especially in determining beneficiaries. 
6. One claiming mechanic's lien must prove that he 
is within group mentioned in statutes as entitled thereto. 
TIMBER STRUCTURES, INC. v. C. W. S. GRINDING 
& MACHINE WORKS, 229 P. 2d 623 (Oregon). 
11. One claiming a mechanic's lien must, in the first 
instance, bring himself clearly within the terms of stat-
utes creating lien. 
12. The Mechanics' Lien Statute is strictly construed 
as to persons entitled to its benefits and as to procedure 
necessary to perfect lien, but when claimant's right has 
been clearly established the law will be liberally inter-
preted to accomplish purposes of its enactment. 
BELL BROS. & CO., INC. v. ARNOLD et al. - 68 SW 2d 
958 (Tenn.) 
3. Mechanic's lien, being purely statutory, is not 
liberally c.onstrued to be enforceable against persons not 
e·numerated in statute. 
IN RE AMERICAN LIME CO. - 201 FED. 433, at 
PAGE 435 it was said: "(2) It is well settled, however, 
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that while this statute is to be liberally construed in 
reference to the property to which the lien attaches, only 
those persons enumerated and embraced in the statute 
are to be held entitled to the lien and that no persons are 
to be included under its provisions unless they make it 
clearly appear that they are so entitled, without a 
strained construction of the statute." 
ANDERSON et al, v. CHAMBLISS et al, 262 P. 2d 298 
(Oregon) 
3. Because the right to a lien is purely statutory, 
a claimant to such a lien must in the first instance bring 
himself clearly within terms of Mechanics' Lien Law. 
4. The Mechanics' Lien Law is strictly construed as 
to persons entitled to its benefits and as to the procedure 
necessary to perfect the lien. 
6. When claimant's right to mechanics' lien has been 
clearly established, Mechanics' Lien Law will be liber-
ally interpreted toward accomplishing the purpose of its 
enactment. 
RICHARDSON v. LANIUS, 263 SW 799 (Tenn.) 
6. Mechanic's liens statutes are strictly construed 
against those seeking to come within them, and liberally 
construed as to inclusion of property and subjecting it 
to lien, but are not given a strained construction to bring 
one within their provisions. 
PILLOW v. KELLY et al. - 296 SW 11 (Tenn.) 
1. The mechanic's lien statute (Shannon's Code Sec. 
3531) protects those embraced within its terms, and can-
not be extended by construction. 
2. Court cannot extend benefit of mechanic's lien 
statute (Shannon's Code Sec. 3531) to either persons 
or objects not embraced within its terms, a·nd in deter-
mining its breadth and scope must be guided both by 
words and context. 
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II. A CONTRACT FOR THE LEVELING OF LAND FOR 
AGRICULTURAL PURPOSES DOES NOT FALL WITH-
IN THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 14-2-1 U.C.A. 1953 
It is important to keep in mind that the land level-
ing to be done under the alleged contract between 
respondents, landowners, and the contractor, Busby, was 
the leveling of land for agricultural purposes. The land 
leveling called for by the contract was not incidental 
to or a part of the process of the construction of any 
building or structure upon the land. Our case is not 
to be confused with excavations or the moving of dirt 
involved in the digging of a basement or the moving of 
dirt or the breaking of land in connection with the 
building of a building or structure upon land, as these 
operations are as much a part of the process of building 
a building or structure as the building of the roof. 
We are confronted with the question, does the stat-
ute 14-2-1 U.C.A. 1953, apply to a c,ontract calling for the 
mere moving of the soil, a contract for the leveling of 
land for agricultural purposes. 
In deciding this question it must be kept in mind that 
when deciding who falls within the burdens and the 
benefits of Mechanics' Lien Statutes and Private Contrac-
tors' Bond Statutes, such statutes should not be extended 
by c,onstruction and should not be liberally construed 
against a landowner, in an effort to bring him within the 
burdens of the statute, or be liberally construed in favor 
of a claimant in an effort to bring him within the bene-
fits of such statutes. 
We must also keep in mind that the words "or im-
provement upon land" must be construed in connection 
with the words which precede them and when these gen-
eral terms are construed in connection with the specific 
enumeration which precedes them, namely, "for the con-
struction, addition to, or alteration or repair of any 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
building, structure" it is clear that these general terms 
apply to the same class or kind as those specifically men-
tioned which relate to buildings or structures, and that 
these general terms do not apply to agricultural pro-
cesses or agricultural betterments, such as the railing 
of brush, or the removal of trees, or the first breaking 
of the land, or the hauling of manure or the application 
of other fertilizers to the land, or to the mere moving of 
dirt, having no connection with the building of any build-
ing or structure, or the leveling of land for agricultural 
purposes, or to the planting and cultivating of shrubs and 
orchards, or to the planting and cultivating of perrennial 
leguminous crops such as alfalfa, and similar "agricultur-
al betterments" or "improvements" of or to the land and 
which admittedly enhance the value of the land but 
which clearly do not fall within the classes of improve-
ments or structures upon the land specifically enumerat-
ed in the wording preceding the general terms "or im-
provement upon land." 
In support of the rule that these and similar agri-
cultural processes, or agricultural betterments or im-
provements do not fall within the scope of the Utah 
statutes and similar statutes, respondents submit the fol-
lowing authorities: 
YOUNG v. SHRIVER-206 P. 99, 56 Cal. App 653, held 
that a mechanics' lien does not lie for the plowing and 
breaking of farm lands for the first time, even under a 
statute giving a lien, "to any one who grades, fills-in or 
otherwise improves any lot or tract of land, or the street 
or sidewalk adjoining the same, or who makes any im-
provements in connection therewith." The statute in-
volved was a much more favorable statute to the claim-
ant than is our statute. 
In this case the court said: "It seems to us that there 
are substantial reasons why a lien should not lie for labor 
performed in preparing lands for use for agric,ultural pur-
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poses in any case. If a lien were allowable for plowing the 
land, by analogy a lien would be allowable for labor per-
formed in fertilizing and cultivating and planting it to 
crops or in harvesting the crops or any other labor nec-
essarily incident to the business of farming or of fruit 
raising or any other purpose to which large bodies of ag-
ricultural lands may be adapted and put." 
BROWN v. WYMAN and another, 9 NW 344, held: 
The breaking of land for the first time is not an improve-
ment upon land and hence not lienable under Sec. 2130 
of Code securing a lien to "every mechanic or other per-
son who shall do any labor upon, or furnish any materi-
als, machinery, or fixtures for, any buildi'ng, erection, or 
other improvement upon land." The court said: "Now 
while breaking and turning over of the soil may con-
stitute an improvement of the land, it cannot in any 
just sense be denominated an improvement upon the 
land ... Fertilizers greatly improve land. It would prob-
ably not be claimed that a lien would be acquired for 
hauling manure upon land." 
OGDEN v. BYINGTON et al, 244 P. 332 (Cal.) 
2. Plaintiff, furnishing tenant stock and equipment 
for construction of irrigation ditches and levee work in 
preparing certain lands for planting rise, HELD not to 
have a lien on such land, under code Civ. Proc. Sec. 1183, 
establishing mechanic's lien, or section 1191, providing 
for lien on lots for improvement; work not having struc-
tural character or permanency necessary to bring it with-
in statute. 
HOWE v. MYERS.- 162 P. 1000, 94 Wash. 563, held labor 
for c,ultivating and caring for an orchard, which admitted-
ly enhanced the value of the land, was not lienable under 
a statute providing that: "Any person who, at the request 
of the owner of any real property, his agent, contractor 
or sub-contractor, clears, grades, fills in or otherwise 
improves the same, or any street or road in front of or 
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adjoining the same, has a lien upon such real property 
for the labor performed, or the materials furnished for 
such purposes." 
In this case the court said: "If the claim asserted is 
lienable under this statute, it must be so by virtue of the 
clause 'or otherwise improves the same.' It cannot be 
said that labor performed in cultivating and caring for 
an orchard is of the same general character or in the 
same general class as labor in grading, clearing, or filling 
in land, and therefore, under the well-known rule of 
ejusdem generis, is not within the statute. EASTER ARK. 
HEDGE-FENCE CO. v. TANNER, 67 Ark. 156, 53 S.W. 
886 It is well settled that liens of this character are in 
derogation of the common law. They depend for their ex-
istence solely on the statutes, and the courts refuse to ex-
tend their operation for the benefit of those who do not 
come clearly within the terms of the statute." (Underlin-
ing ours). 
III. RENTAL VALUE OF MACHINERY AND EQUIP-
MENT HIRED TO CONTRACTOR AND USED BY HIM 
IN CARRYING OUT CONTRACT FOR LEVELING LAND 
FOR AGRICULTURAL PURPOSES IS NEITHER "MA-
TERIALS FURNISHED" OR "LABOR PERFORMED" 
UNDER THE CONTRACT AND IS NOT WITHIN THE 
SCOPE OF SECTIONS 14-2-1 AND 14-2-2 U. C. A: 1953. 
The language of the statute limits the personal 
liability of the landowner, who has not required the con-
tractor to furnish a bond, (assuming it was a case where 
the thing being built brought the contract within the 
statute), to those who have furnished materials or per-
formed labor under the contract." The statute does not 
extend the personal liability of the landowner to one who 
has furnished a tool, a device, a machine, or piece of 
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equipment which was used in the construction, addition 
to, or alteration or repair of any building, structure or 
improveme·nt upon land. 
Modern tools, devices, machines and equipment are 
used in accomplishing labor but this does not mean that 
a bare tool, device, or machine constitutes labor or that 
the bare furnishing of a tool, device or machine consti-
tutes "labor performed" or that the bare "rental value of 
machinery or equipment" hired to the contractor consti-
tutes "labor performed." If a contractor or any other per-
son does the work of construction with the use of a tool~ 
or a device, or a machine, or equipment this constitutes 
"labor performed." We are certainly not contending that 
labor need be performed with one's hands or that modern 
tools, machinery and equipment cannot be used in per-
forming the labor of construction. But, if a third person 
merely hires a tool, a device, a machine or equipment to 
a contractor or to someone else who is engaged in the 
construction, he does not himself, simply by furnishing 
a machine, "perform labor" in the construction. The 
bare furnishing of a machine is not performing labor. The 
tool, device or machine itself is not labor. When the con-
tractor or workman engaged in the construction adds his 
skill and direction to the machine or tool, applies the 
"Know How" and operates the tool or machine, and some-
times uses other elements to make it work, such as gas-
oline or electricty, then "labor" is performed, but the 
tool, device or machine standing alone and un-applied 
(the thing hired in our case) does not constitute labor. 
It is the person who puts the machine to work who per-
forms the labor, not the one who hires or otherwise fur-
nishes the machine or tool to the c.ontractor or workman. 
It is respondents contention that the Utah Supreme 
Court has never heretofore passed on either of the ques-
tions involved in our case, namely, {1) whether a con~ 
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tract for the leveling of land for agricultural purposes 
falls within the scope of the Utah Private Contractors' 
Bond Statutes; or (2) whether one who hires land-level-
ing machinery and equipment to a land-leveling con-
tractor falls within the scope of these statutes, as one 
who has "furnished rna terials or performed labor under 
the contract." 
The decision in the case of J. F. TOLTON INV. CO. 
v. MARYLAND CASUALTY CO. 293 P. 611, 77 Utah 226, 
is definitely not controlling or even in point i'n our case 
as that case involved the construction of a surety bond 
while our case involves the construction of the Utah 
Private Contractors' Bond Statutes and quite a different 
rules of construction applies in the two cases. The same 
situation prevailed in all other cases cited in Appellant's 
Brief pages 13 to 19, both inclusive. Every one of these 
cases involved the construction of surety bond, and the 
rule of liberal construction against the surety for hire was 
applied in all of these cases. As heretofore pointed out a 
different rule applies when construing Mechanics' Lien 
Statutes and Private Contractors' Bond Statutes, partic-
ularly when determining what perso·ns and objects fall 
within their scope. These statutes should not be liberally 
construed against a landowner in an effort to bring a 
landowner within the scope of the statute, who except 
for liberal construction, does not belong there, as hereto-
fore pointed out. 
In the majority opinion in the case of J. F. TOL-
TO INV. CO. v. MARYLAND CASUALTY CO., supra, it 
was recognized that there is a conflict in the decisions 
as to whether an item for rental on equipment falls with-
in the surety bond, (indeed there are many well reasoned 
cases holding to the contrary), and the court said: "with-
out further reference to the cases, it may be said that, 
under the liberal rule of interpretation to which we are 
committed, we conclude that the charge in question is 
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within the obligatio·n of the bond, and the surety was 
properly held liable." (Underlined ours). The "liberal 
rule of interpretation" referred to in the opinion is the 
rule requiring a liberal construction or a surety bond, 
against a surety for hire. No such rule of liberal construc-
tion against the landowner can be properly applied when 
construing the statutes involved in our case to determine 
whether the contract in question falls within the statutes 
or the thing furnished by appellant falls within these 
statutes. 
Justice Straup wrote a strong dissenting opinion 
in the TOLTON case in which he forcibly pointed out 
that the rentals agreed to be paid by the contractor for 
the use of an engine or other machinery used on the job 
was neither "materials" or "labor" within the mea·ning of 
the contract, and were not covered by the surety bond, 
despite the rule of liberal construction against the surety. 
Must every landowner who has some structure built 
upon his land, where the amount involved exceeds $500., 
inquire from the contractor and everyone who partici-
pates in the construction, whether every tool, appliance, 
device, or item of machinery or equipment used on the 
job has been rented, and if so must he decide at his peril 
whether the rental value of such tool, appliance, device, 
or machine has been paid? If the workman or contractor 
says he owns the tool, appliance, device, or machine that 
he is using must the landowner then ascertain at his peril 
whether the full purchase price has been paid - as no 
distinction should be made between one who leases equiP-
ment and one who sells it to a workman or c,ontractor? 
Or is it sufficient if the landowner takes precautions to 
see that those who have "furnished materials" or "per-
formed labor" within the ordinary and sensible meaning 
of these terms have been paid? 
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Had the Utah Legislature intended to impose liability 
on a landowner to pay the rental value of machinery, 
tools, appliances, or equipment hired to the contractor 
or anyone involved in the construction, and used on the 
job and then returned, it would have said so, like some 
state legislatures have done. As the statute stands it is 
not so worded, and cannot be extended by construction 
to read something into it which is not there. 
When the statutes in question are not liberally con-
strued against the landowner certainly it should be held 
that re·ntal on machinery and equipment furnished to the 
land-leveling contractor does not fall within the scope 
of these statutes. 
The following authorities are submitted as support-
ing the rule that the rental value of machinery and equip-
ment hired to the contractor or to someone else on the 
job, which is used on the job but not consumed, is 
neither "materials furnished" or "labor performed," and 
does not fall within the scope of Mechanics' Lien Statutes 
or Private Contractors' Bond Statutes having the same o"r 
similar wording as the Utah Statutes: 
36 AM. JUR. Page 56, Sec. 70. " .... The general rule 
is that articles furnished for use merely as tools and ap-
pliances in carrying on the work of construction are not 
materials for which a mechanics' lien may be claimed. 
The same is true of machinery furnished for the con-
tractor for use as a part of his plant or operations." 
ROAD SUPPLY & METAL CO. v. BECHTELHEIM-
ER et al, 240 P. 846, (Kan.) 2. The rent or value of the 
use of machinery, tools, and equipment used in public 
work is neither labor nor material within the meaning of 
our statutes pertaining to mechanics' liens. 
NINNEMAN et al v. CITY OF LEWISTON, 129 P. 
1073 (Idaho) . 
1. A lien cannot be had under the mechanic's lien 
laws of this state for tools and appliances which are the 
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property of the contractors or laborers, and that are not 
necessarily consumed in the specific work, but which may 
be used, from time to time, in other works and upon oth-
er contracts 
WILKINSON v. PACIFIC MID-WEST OIL CO. et al 
107 P. 2nd 726 (Kan.) 
1. The rent or value of the use of machinery cannot 
be made the basis of a mechanics' lien. 
CONSOLIDATED CUT STONE CO. et al, v. SEIDEN-
BACH at al, 75 P. 2nd 442 (Okl.) 
16. A subcontractor was not entitled to lien for rent-
al for use of pans and ends which were furnished to con-
tractor to hold concrete in place in building operations 
and which were removed by owner to be used on other 
jobs, since such pans and ends did not become part of the 
building. 
MARION MACIDNE, FOUNDRY & SUPPLY CO. v. 
ALLEN et al., 241 P. 450 (Kan.) 
2. The tools and equipment used in the sinking of 
an oil and gas well, which forms no part of the well or 
completed work, is neither "labor not material" within 
the meaning of the lien statute. 
GILBERT HUNT CO. v. PARRY, 110 P. 541, (Wash.) 
1. Under the lien laws, generally, "material" is 
deemed to be something that goes into, and becomes 
a part of the finished structure, such as lumber, mails, 
glass, hardware, etc., which are necessary to the comple-
tion of a building. 
2. The object of the lien statutes being to secure a 
lien for that which goes into the structure, articles fur-
nished for use merely as tools and appliances are not 
lienable. 
AMERICAN TANK & EQUIPMENT CO. v. T. E. 
WIGGINS, INC., et al., 42 P. 2d 114 (Okl.) 
1. Mechanics' liens are in derogation of c,ommon law 
and exist solely by positive statute, which courts should 
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construe and enforce as remedial acts, but which cannot 
be extended to meet cases not within their scope. 
3. Purchase price of pipe furnished to contractor for 
use in pumping sand and water in constructing embank-
ment on railroad right of way held not lienable, since pipe 
constituted part of contractor's equipment. 
HALL et al., v. COWEN et al., 98 P. 670, 51 Wash. 
295. 
1 A claim for rental on scrapers is neither "labor 
performed" nor "material furnished," within Ballinger's 
Ann. Codes & St. Sac. 5902, giving one who at the owner's 
request, grades, etc. land or a street in front thereof, a 
lien for the "labor performed" and "materials furnished." 
The Court in HENRY BICKEL CO. v. NATIONAL 
SURETY CO. et al, 156 Ky. 695, 161 S. W. 1113, said: "The 
engine which was used in this case occupied the same 
place as a hammer, saw, or other tool used by the Work-
men. The person who rented the engine is no more entit-
led to a lien .... than the merchant would be who sold 
the spades, drills, or other tools constituting his plant." 
CONCLUSION 
Owing to the fact that the contract pleaded, namely 
a contract for the leveling of land for agricultural pur-
poses does not fall within the scope of the Utah Statutes 
relied upon by Apellant, and the rental value of machin-
ery and equipment hired by Appellant to the land-level-
ing contractor constitute ·neither "materials furnished" 
or "labor performed" under the contract, hence Appel-
lant's Complaint does not state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted and the decision of the District Court 
granting Respondents' Motion to Dismiss and dismissing 
the Complaint should be affirmed. 
Respec.tfully submitted, 
DURHAM MORRIS 
Attorney for Respondents. 
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